How S-100 is set up
No, this will not be about what a universal data model is and how it is used to describe data – i.e., standards. Let us only note that the use of S-100 is not a guarantee of quality, just as the use of, for example, the English language does not mean that everything said in it is true. This will be about how S-100 is structured in relation to the main task. The most appropriate characteristic for this is -
The idea of increasing navigational safety has been substituted by the idea of transitioning to S-100, while carefully avoiding the question – how, exactly, does S-100 increase safety? The obvious answer – it does not but deems opposite. No explanations, no assessments, let alone any serious research can be found. Apologists for S-100 elegantly avoid discussing this tactless question.
Under the conditions of massive propaganda, this simple substitution works well. Budgets are allocated for increasing safety and spending them is reported as S-100 implementation.
"SUBSTITUTION"
The idea of increasing navigational safety has been substituted by the idea of transitioning to S-100, while carefully avoiding the question – how, exactly, does S-100 increase safety? The obvious answer – it does not but deems opposite. No explanations, no assessments, let alone any serious research can be found. Apologists for S-100 elegantly avoid discussing this tactless question.
Under the conditions of massive propaganda, this simple substitution works well. Budgets are allocated for increasing safety and spending them is reported as S-100 implementation.
It is impossible not to notice the similarity between mind control in totalitarian sects and the attempt to manipulate the professional community. The argument about the necessity of transitioning to S-100 only because it was approved within a democratic procedure sounds surprising; Giordano Bruno was executed within a democratic procedure. For a navigator who has had an accident, this will be poor excuse.
Credit must be given to the elegance such manipulation is carried out. First, the problem of increasing safety is substituted with the task of implementing S-100, after which its main advantage is declared as "interoperability" – i.e., the possibility (sometimes they talk about improved possibility) of joint data use.
Credit must be given to the elegance such manipulation is carried out. First, the problem of increasing safety is substituted with the task of implementing S-100, after which its main advantage is declared as "interoperability" – i.e., the possibility (sometimes they talk about improved possibility) of joint data use.
- Excuse me, but how is safety increasing related to S-100?
- What kind of question is that? It's obvious to everyone that it's the same thing.
- Why is it obvious to everyone?
- Well, everyone is talking about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
- What kind of question is that? It's obvious to everyone that it's the same thing.
- Why is it obvious to everyone?
- Well, everyone is talking about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
- Here's your S-100 and here's your joint data use. After all, data is being used jointly, you can't deny that. Bingo! Problem solved, budget spent, give us more.
- However, may I ask, but data is also used jointly now. What's the difference?
- Yes, it can be, but now it's used somehow differently, poorly, in a word. We have significantly improved it.
- And how exactly has it been improved?
- Oh, what is the vulgar question. It's said it's improved, so it's improved, everyone knows about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
- However, may I ask, but data is also used jointly now. What's the difference?
- Yes, it can be, but now it's used somehow differently, poorly, in a word. We have significantly improved it.
- And how exactly has it been improved?
- Oh, what is the vulgar question. It's said it's improved, so it's improved, everyone knows about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
Table of Contents:
Maritime safety and the collective unconscious.
Hydrographic Notes
Christmas edition, 2025
How S-100 is set up
Hydrographic Notes
Christmas edition, 2025
Christmas edition, 2025
No, this will not be about what a universal data model is and how it is used to describe data – i.e., standards. Let us only note that the use of S-100 is not a guarantee of quality, just as the use of, for example, the English language does not mean that everything said in it is true. This will be about how S-100 is structured in relation to the main task. The most appropriate characteristic for this is -
The idea of increasing navigational safety has been substituted by the idea of transitioning to S-100, while carefully avoiding the question – how, exactly, does S-100 increase safety? The obvious answer – it does not but deems opposite. No explanations, no assessments, let alone any serious research can be found. Apologists for S-100 elegantly avoid discussing this tactless question.
Under the conditions of massive propaganda, this simple substitution works well. Budgets are allocated for increasing safety and spending them is reported as S-100 implementation.
- Excuse me, but how is safety increasing related to S-100?
- What kind of question is that? It's obvious to everyone that it's the same thing.
- Why is it obvious to everyone?
- Well, everyone is talking about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
It is impossible not to notice the similarity between mind control in totalitarian sects and the attempt to manipulate the professional community. The argument about the necessity of transitioning to S-100 only because it was approved within a democratic procedure sounds surprising; Giordano Bruno was executed within a democratic procedure. For a navigator who has had an accident, this will be poor excuse.
Credit must be given to the elegance such manipulation is carried out. First, the problem of increasing safety is substituted with the task of implementing S-100, after which its main advantage is declared as "interoperability" – i.e., the possibility (sometimes they talk about improved possibility) of joint data use.
- Here's your S-100 and here's your joint data use. After all, data is being used jointly, you can't deny that. Bingo! Problem solved, budget spent, give us more.
- However, may I ask, but data is also used jointly now. What's the difference?
- Yes, it can be, but now it's used somehow differently, poorly, in a word. We have significantly improved it.
- And how exactly has it been improved?
- Oh, what is the vulgar question. It's said it's improved, so it's improved, everyone knows about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
"SUBSTITUTION"
The idea of increasing navigational safety has been substituted by the idea of transitioning to S-100, while carefully avoiding the question – how, exactly, does S-100 increase safety? The obvious answer – it does not but deems opposite. No explanations, no assessments, let alone any serious research can be found. Apologists for S-100 elegantly avoid discussing this tactless question.
Under the conditions of massive propaganda, this simple substitution works well. Budgets are allocated for increasing safety and spending them is reported as S-100 implementation.
- Excuse me, but how is safety increasing related to S-100?
- What kind of question is that? It's obvious to everyone that it's the same thing.
- Why is it obvious to everyone?
- Well, everyone is talking about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
It is impossible not to notice the similarity between mind control in totalitarian sects and the attempt to manipulate the professional community. The argument about the necessity of transitioning to S-100 only because it was approved within a democratic procedure sounds surprising; Giordano Bruno was executed within a democratic procedure. For a navigator who has had an accident, this will be poor excuse.
Credit must be given to the elegance such manipulation is carried out. First, the problem of increasing safety is substituted with the task of implementing S-100, after which its main advantage is declared as "interoperability" – i.e., the possibility (sometimes they talk about improved possibility) of joint data use.
- Here's your S-100 and here's your joint data use. After all, data is being used jointly, you can't deny that. Bingo! Problem solved, budget spent, give us more.
- However, may I ask, but data is also used jointly now. What's the difference?
- Yes, it can be, but now it's used somehow differently, poorly, in a word. We have significantly improved it.
- And how exactly has it been improved?
- Oh, what is the vulgar question. It's said it's improved, so it's improved, everyone knows about it – respected people, reputable organizations. You can ask anyone, everyone will tell you.
Maritime safety and the collective unconscious.
Table of Contents:
War is peace.
War is easy to start and hard to finish. Some want to destroy a neighboring state, some the world order, and some S-57. The inevitable question after the battle is over – what was all this for? What benefits, advantages, and profits did we gain and at what cost? No one really wants to answer therefore – keep going regardless of everything.
Like an aggression against a neighboring state the desire to destroy S-57 is covered up by safety. We wage war to make it safe, we are to dismantle the S-57 operational environment, why? Correct, to make it safe. The question WHY it makes safe is not welcome and, in some cases, dangerous.
S-100 has declared war on S-57, trying to destroy navigation safety created over decades by the joint efforts of the international hydrographic community, technology companies, navigators, and users worldwide. To destroy what has long been working successfully.
In our opinion, exactly because S-57 has been working successfully and reliably for a long time. The outrageous situation with the well-functioning S-57 deprives a huge number of respected people of the opportunity to prove their necessity for maritime safety.
Like an aggression against a neighboring state the desire to destroy S-57 is covered up by safety. We wage war to make it safe, we are to dismantle the S-57 operational environment, why? Correct, to make it safe. The question WHY it makes safe is not welcome and, in some cases, dangerous.
S-100 has declared war on S-57, trying to destroy navigation safety created over decades by the joint efforts of the international hydrographic community, technology companies, navigators, and users worldwide. To destroy what has long been working successfully.
WHY?
In our opinion, exactly because S-57 has been working successfully and reliably for a long time. The outrageous situation with the well-functioning S-57 deprives a huge number of respected people of the opportunity to prove their necessity for maritime safety.
The successful and reliably functioning S-57 publication system set on risk international corporations’ interest, moreover, the successfully functioning standard creates preconditions for decentralized data distribution. The situation must be urgently resolved, something new has to be invented in the future, remaining as before and even better.
At first everything went well, and in the early 2000s, quite meaningful work was underway to improve S-57. But it was realized that one couldn't sit on such a topic for twenty-five years and couldn't expand the market because S-57 works simple and clear, the decision was taken to make it sophisticated and expensive. Twenty-five years of relentless struggle against S-57 for safety, millions of funds spent, hundreds of meetings, tons of documents. What is the result?
At first everything went well, and in the early 2000s, quite meaningful work was underway to improve S-57. But it was realized that one couldn't sit on such a topic for twenty-five years and couldn't expand the market because S-57 works simple and clear, the decision was taken to make it sophisticated and expensive. Twenty-five years of relentless struggle against S-57 for safety, millions of funds spent, hundreds of meetings, tons of documents. What is the result?
The hard work in lengthy period was not finally completed and if trouble happens and S-100 is implemented like S-57, it can deal with that problem too, the main thing is to follow the procedure at the IMO and the IHO with new standards. If not, what's already standardized can be re-standardized.
RESULTS OF 25 YEARS’ WORK
S-101 is an almost complete replica of S-57, by more than 95%. Over twenty-five years of dedicated work, the S-100 developers simply renamed S-57 objects and attributes into S-101 objects and attributes.
The developers set about reworking PL, those rules for displaying cartographic information, which were replaced by display procedures in the Lua language. How programming procedures can be offered as an international standard is a question of legal classification, still not very clear. But the fact that these procedures work slowly and ECDIS manufacturers now must resort to additional tricks to optimize performance – was this done on purpose? To give an advantage to the Lua developers? And who are they? Oh, are they the ones who advocate most for the advantage of S-100 and demonstrate an S-100 ECDIS prototype at every opportunity? It seems that "interoperability" was invented by the same people and for the same purpose.
The new quality standard S-158 has been developed, created like the S-58, a necessary thing, of course, but the question arises – if S-57 and S-101 are almost identical, then most likely the rules for checking them should be the same or almost the same? No, in S-158 we find a significant number of new tests related to S-57 data but are absent in S-58. In other words, identical information, in the opinion of the S-100 developers, should satisfy different requirements.
Only a stubborn sceptic would disagree that all the above is done in the name of safety. But seriously, the difference in the rules for checking identical data pushes maritime administrations to publish low-quality charts and publications – more precisely, not equally qualitative.
Let's move on to the "interoperability," the backbone of the entire S-100 reasoning. Just don't put S-100 supporters in an awkward position – you still won't get a coherent answer; at best, you'll hear lengthy discussions about the joint data use.
The question is how to use more detailed bathymetric survey data jointly with official ENC. What's the problem, an inexperienced reader might ask, display and use more precise data over less precise ones, as is now widely done with S-57 ENC at different scales – zooming in, you can see it in detail; zooming out, the image blurs, becomes less detailed, it is very simple and intuitive. But simplicity looks is the main enemy of S-100 supporters, so they replace a simple solution with a complex one.
What if, they say, a cartographer wants to use data blending instead of overlaying, for example, taking depth contours from the ENC, depths from survey data, etc. And all this is in the dynamic process of real time navigation. For this purpose, another standard called S-98 is proposed, which will contain instructions for creating such a product. So, instead of a ready-made ENC, you receive its components and instructions for making it right on your ECDIS during the voyage – it's clear to everyone that this is much more reliable and safer than using ready-made and verified products.
Hypothetically this can be done, but again WHY, what is the purpose and how does it improve marine safety? The simple and cost-effective alternatives are more accurate charts published based on up-to-date surveys, or S-102 and S-101 can be used in the same way as ENCs work now. A pointless effort, you will not get an answer to the question of how S-100 interoperability simplifies, reduces costs, and speeds up cartographic production and how much it makes navigation safer, because it is the opposite – all this just complicates and makes cartographic production more expensive, without providing any safety advantages.
The developers set about reworking PL, those rules for displaying cartographic information, which were replaced by display procedures in the Lua language. How programming procedures can be offered as an international standard is a question of legal classification, still not very clear. But the fact that these procedures work slowly and ECDIS manufacturers now must resort to additional tricks to optimize performance – was this done on purpose? To give an advantage to the Lua developers? And who are they? Oh, are they the ones who advocate most for the advantage of S-100 and demonstrate an S-100 ECDIS prototype at every opportunity? It seems that "interoperability" was invented by the same people and for the same purpose.
The new quality standard S-158 has been developed, created like the S-58, a necessary thing, of course, but the question arises – if S-57 and S-101 are almost identical, then most likely the rules for checking them should be the same or almost the same? No, in S-158 we find a significant number of new tests related to S-57 data but are absent in S-58. In other words, identical information, in the opinion of the S-100 developers, should satisfy different requirements.
Only a stubborn sceptic would disagree that all the above is done in the name of safety. But seriously, the difference in the rules for checking identical data pushes maritime administrations to publish low-quality charts and publications – more precisely, not equally qualitative.
Let's move on to the "interoperability," the backbone of the entire S-100 reasoning. Just don't put S-100 supporters in an awkward position – you still won't get a coherent answer; at best, you'll hear lengthy discussions about the joint data use.
The question is how to use more detailed bathymetric survey data jointly with official ENC. What's the problem, an inexperienced reader might ask, display and use more precise data over less precise ones, as is now widely done with S-57 ENC at different scales – zooming in, you can see it in detail; zooming out, the image blurs, becomes less detailed, it is very simple and intuitive. But simplicity looks is the main enemy of S-100 supporters, so they replace a simple solution with a complex one.
What if, they say, a cartographer wants to use data blending instead of overlaying, for example, taking depth contours from the ENC, depths from survey data, etc. And all this is in the dynamic process of real time navigation. For this purpose, another standard called S-98 is proposed, which will contain instructions for creating such a product. So, instead of a ready-made ENC, you receive its components and instructions for making it right on your ECDIS during the voyage – it's clear to everyone that this is much more reliable and safer than using ready-made and verified products.
Hypothetically this can be done, but again WHY, what is the purpose and how does it improve marine safety? The simple and cost-effective alternatives are more accurate charts published based on up-to-date surveys, or S-102 and S-101 can be used in the same way as ENCs work now. A pointless effort, you will not get an answer to the question of how S-100 interoperability simplifies, reduces costs, and speeds up cartographic production and how much it makes navigation safer, because it is the opposite – all this just complicates and makes cartographic production more expensive, without providing any safety advantages.
Conclusions
S-101 is practically no different from S-57 but requires extra efforts for cartographic production. S-101 does not imply any increase in safety, while increases the cost of navigational products require additional resources to maintain the synchronization of both S-57/S-101 portfolios. Interoperability in S-57 and S-100 is practically no different from each other, and in the latter case, no safety advantages are implied. In this context the cost of S-100 ECDIS manufacturing is becoming higher and less reliable.
Standard weaponizing as a mean of pursuing individual interests, is an example of power with no responsibility. The fact is S-100, as extremely complex matter is associated with cost and risks therefore requires an adequate assessment under the condition where all points of view are considered. The argument that S-100 has been adopted and therefore must be realized is not absolute. Yes, the standard is international, but this does not prevent its better study and deeper understanding; moreover, the means, paths, and timelines for making it true remains in hands of National Maritime Administrations having a wide range of possibilities. S-100 is not a verdict; it is a process where the quality is essential for the entire maritime community.
- S-100 inbreeding into the public mind is carried out through massive propaganda and the use of manipulative practices beyond the framework of critical analysis, which, if successful, will cause maximum damage to the professional community.
- Rocks, shoals, and navigational obstacles probably pose less danger to navigation nowadays compared to excessive technical complexity arising because of an uncontrolled formal process and a desire to profit.
- Complexity is expensive and unreliable, therefore, dangerous.
Standard weaponizing as a mean of pursuing individual interests, is an example of power with no responsibility. The fact is S-100, as extremely complex matter is associated with cost and risks therefore requires an adequate assessment under the condition where all points of view are considered. The argument that S-100 has been adopted and therefore must be realized is not absolute. Yes, the standard is international, but this does not prevent its better study and deeper understanding; moreover, the means, paths, and timelines for making it true remains in hands of National Maritime Administrations having a wide range of possibilities. S-100 is not a verdict; it is a process where the quality is essential for the entire maritime community.